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FILING OF RESPONSE 
Plaintiff!s Response to Defendants1 Petition for 
Rehearing is filed purusant to Rule 35, Rules of the Utah 
Court of Appeals, and at the specific request of the Court. 
REPLY TO DEFENDANTS1 ARGUMENT FOR REHEARING 
REPLY TO POINT I, THE BERUBE CASE SHOULD APPLY 
RETROACTIVELY TO THE INSTANT CASE. 
DEFENDANTS HAVE MISREPRESENTED CASE 
LAW ON THE QUESTION OF 
RETROACTIVITY. 
In reversing the lower court!s summary judgment for 
Defendants, this court relied on Berube v. Fashion Centre 
Inc. Ltd, 104 Utah Adv. Rep 4, decided recently by the Utah 
Supreme Court. (The facts and the course in the lower court 
of that case are remarkably similar to the instant case.) 
Defendants, in their petiton for rehearing, argue that 
Berube should not be applied retroactively to the instant 
case. In so arguing, Defendants have quoted most 
selectively from among cases on the subject of retroactivity 
with the result that the picture presented can at best be 
described as distorted. 
Defendants, for instance, ignore Malan v. Lewis. 693 P.2d 
661 (Utah 1984), a significant Utah case on the question of 
retroactivity and a case similar to the instant case 
concerning that issue. In Malan, the lower court granted 
summary judgment to defendants on the grounds that the Utah 
-1-
Guest Statute (which had previously been found 
constitutional) precluded plaintiff's suit. On appeal, the 
Utah Supreme Court reversed earlier positions that the Guest 
Statute was constitional, held the statute unconstitutional 
and ordered a trial for plaintiffs. Defendants petitioned 
for a rehearing, contending that the ruling that the statute 
was now unconstitutional should be applied prospectively 
only. The court denied the petition for rehearing, defining 
the Utah position on retroactivity: 
The general rule from time immemorial is that 
the ruling of a court is deemed to state the true 
nature of the law both retoractively and 
prospectively...in the vast majority of cases a 
decision is effective both prospectively and 
retospectively, even an overruling 
decision...Whether the general rule should be 
departed from depends on whether a substantial 
injustice would occur... 
We may, in our discretion, prohibit retroactive 
operation where the !overruled law has been 
justifiably relied upon or where retroactive 
operation creates a burden.l Loyal Order of Moose, 
657 P.2d at 265... 
The defendants in this case do not argue that 
they justifiably relied on our prior decisions 
sustaining the constitutionality of the Guest 
Statute. There is no evidence that the defendants 
knew of the Guest Statute and relied upon it in 
offering a ride to the plaintiff. The bare 
assertion by defendants that our decision overrules 
prior cases sustaining the constitutionality of the 
Guest Statute is insufficient to prohibit its 
retroactive application. [At 676; emphasis added.] 
MaIan was quoted and followed in the later case of Belden 
v. Dalbo Inc., 752 P.2d 1317 (Uth App. 1988). 
The Defendants here rely on Timpanogos Planning & Water 
Management v. Central Utah Water Conservancy District, 690 
P.2d 562 (Utah 1984). But the Supreme Court in MaIan 
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specifically rejected that case as support for prospective 
only application of the Guest Statute ruling, pointing out 
that the ruling in Timpanogos was prospective only because 
of the actual reliance on the statute by various entities. 
In Timpanogos, members of certain boards had been appointed 
by a method later found unconstitutional. The court ruled 
that giving that determination retroactive application would 
call into question all of the actions taken by the board and 
would unreasonably burden the administration of justice. 
That would not be the situation in the instant case. 
The Supreme Court had earlier discussed the standards 
concerning retroactivity in criminal cases in Andrews v. 
Morris, 677 P.2d 81 (Utah 1983), and "explicitely 
adopted[ed] the following analytic standards for determining 
the retroactivity of new rules...:1) the purpose to be 
served by the new rule; 2) the extent of reliance on the old 
rule, and 3) the effect on the administration of justice of 
a retoractive application of the new rule. " [At 91.] 
Although these were the standards for examining the 
question in a criminal case, they can easily be adapted in 
the analysis of a civil case. 
The Defendants rely on McFarland v. Skaggs Companies 
Inc., 678 P.2d 298 (Utah 1984), where the court discussed 
whether a new actual malace standard should be applied 
prospectively only. The court did discuss the general rule 
as quoted in Defendants1 Petition but Defendants failed to 
quote the application of the general rule in that case. The 
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court declined to limit the application of the new standard 
to future cases, pointing out: "There is no showing of 
reliance upon the former standard or of any resulting burden 
to the administration of justice. We therefore hold that 
the Sunburst doctrine does not preclude application of the 
new !actual malace1 standard in the present case." [At 305.] 
Likewise, in the instant case, Defendants have shown no 
reliance on the pre-Berube standard nor have they shown any 
great burden on the administration of justice that would 
result from a retroactive application of Berube. Under the 
Malan case, their bare assertions are insufficient to 
prohibit retroactive application. If Plaintiff Gilmore 
prevails, the fact that Defendants would face "the 
possibility of a judgment for Gilmorefs back pay in a 
catastrophic amount" (as they describe it in their petition) 
is not the type of burden on the administration of justice 
that the Timpanogos case spoke of. That may be a burden on 
Defendants but it is not a burden on the administration of 
justice. Defendants could have avoided such a 
"catastrophic" possibility simply by following the rules 
that they promulgated and discharging Gilmore properly. 
Defendants present a less than accurate picture of the 
retroactive application of rulings in wrongful discharge 
cases in New Jersey. They cite Bimbo v. Burdette Tomlin 
Memorial Hospital, 644 F.Supp. 1033 (D.N.J. 1986), as 
support for their position. In Bimbo, the federal court in 
New Jersey refused prospective application of a New Jersey 
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Supreme Court case (Woolley v.Hoffman-LaRoche Inc., 491 A.2d 
1257 (N.J. 1985), which had for the first time recognized an 
exception to the at-will doctrine based on a contract 
implied from a policy manual (as Berube has done in Utah). 
What Defendants failed to point out to this court in their 
petition is that the New Jersey state court specifically 
rejected this federal court interpretation of its law in 
Cole v. Carteret Savings Bank, 540 A.2d 923 (N.J.Super.L. 
1988): "This court respectfully disagrees with that holding 
[in Bimbo] and concludes that the Supreme Court in Woolley 
intended to include all claimants." The court also pointed 
out that the New Jersey Supreme Court in Rutherford 
Education Assn. v. Board of Ed., 489 A.2d 1148 (N.J. 1985), 
had thoroughly analyzed the retroactive-prospective 
application of its decisions: 
Not only is it made clear that retoractive 
application is presumed, but a rerview of the 
various factors the court listed to apply in such 
test, makes it abundantly clear that a breach of an 
implied contract would be the type of justifiable 
claim that would be considered retroactively. [At 
927; emphasis added.] 
The propsective application of the Wooley case was 
explored again in Grigoletti v. Ortho Pharmeceutical, 545 
A.2d 185 (N.J.Super.A.D. 1988): 
The theory underpinning prospective 
application of important changes in the law is that 
retroactivity is unfair to those who relied on the 
prior state of the law...Here, plaintiffs contend 
that Ortho voluntarily publihsed a set of employment 
promises in the manual upon which the plaintiffs 
relied and that Ortho failed to live up to those 
promises. Assuming that these claims are 
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established, Ortho's only unfairness defense to the 
retroactive application of Wooley would have to be 
that it never intended to live up to the promises 
contained in the manual it published, and upon which 
its employes allegedly relied. That argument will 
not wash. If plaintiffs are proved, there would be 
nothing unfair about holding Ortho to workplace 
standards it voluntarily promulgated. [At 189; 
emphasis added.] 
RESPONSE TO POINT II, THE INDIVIDUAL DEFENDANTS ARE 
PERSONALLY LIABLE. 
Defendants briefed this point in their original Brief of 
Respondents. In fact, the argument in their Petition for 
Rehearing is a verbatim repeat of that portion of their 
original brief. 
Plaintiff replied to that argument in his Reply Brief, 
pages 21-23, and will not repeat the argument here. In 
summary, however, Plaintiff will point out: 
1. Golden v. Anderson, 256 Cal.App.2d 714, 64 Cal.Rptr. 
404 (1967), cited by Defendants, reaches the conclusion 
opposite to that suggested by Defendants and holds that 
corporate officials may be held personally liable. 
2. Wise v. Southern Pacific Co., 223 Ca.App.2d 50, 35 
Cal. Rptr. 659 (1953), cited by Defendants, concerns 
conspiracy and has no application to the instant case. 
3. Moniodis v. Cook, 494 A.2d 212 (Md.App. 1985), 
ignored by Defendants, directly addressed the question of 
whether an employee or an officer of a corporation can be 
sued individually and held liable for the wrongful discharge 
of an employee and discussed the criteria for answering that 
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question. Applying those criteria to the Gilmore case would 
lead to an answer in the affirmative. 
See Reply Brief of Plaintiff/Appellant for the expanded 
discussion of these points. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff respectfully asks this 
court: 
1. To refuse to rehear this case, or 
2. If the case is reheard, to rule: 
a. That the Berube case does have retroactive 
application, 
b. That the individual Defendants may be held 
personally liable. 
Plaintiff also seeks an award of costs pursuant to Rule 
34, Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals. 
DATED: L—^'K- *T ^  DATED: (r ^  *> °f — 9^7 
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